Safe As Podcast
Safe As Podcast offers a thrifty analysis of safety science, risk, systems, and performance research. It examines practical and cost-conscious approaches to safety in various contexts. Listeners can find additional research at SafetyInsights.Org. The show is hosted by Ben Hutchinson and features intro/outro music 'Dark Synth Wave' by ElephantGreen.
Episodes
E111: Dr Steven Shorrock Part 1: Is HOP actually 'new' or built on Human Factors?
“There’s nothing new since the 1980s there”In part 1 of my interview with Dr Steven Shorrock. He's worked for about 30 years as a psychologist and human factors engineer in aviation, air traffic management, rail, healthcare and chemical manufacturing. Steven questions how much of HOP and the “new view” really comes from human factors and ergonomics research. He argues that many principles popu
E110: Why Low Injury Rates Hide Catastrophic Risk (The Longford Disaster)
This ep unpacks the 1998 Esso Longford gas plant explosion in Victoria, drawing on the safety science and sociological research from Emeritus Professor Andrew Hopkins.We move past proximal causes (like equipment failure) to unpack:a) how organisations construct causesb) manage chronic alarm fatiguec) distort safety metricsd) process critical operational feedbackSupport the channel: https://buymeac
109: High-Energy Hazards & SIF Risk: What the Research Shows (Quickisode)
Are higher-energy hazard interactions more likely to seriously injure or kill people?In this ep, we unpack the empirical link between energy exposure and SIFs - where over 500 injury reports were analysed, and injury energy magnitude was estimated using leading information.Key concepts were energy magnitude - being the amount of energy present; and energy intensity - how concentrated that energy i
108: Professor Robin Dillon-Merrill Part 2: Resilient Vs Vulnerable Near misses
Can AI help us identify critical safety blind-spots before disaster?Part 2 interview with Professor Robin Dillon-Merrill (Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business), who unpacks her 20+ years of research on decision-making under risk, outcome bias, and how organizations misinterpret near misses.We discuss:a) why near-miss biases shape human decision-making & how we can build robust s
E107: Skip-Order-Action Framework: Measuring Work-As-Done in the Field (HOP / Safety-II)
Today we unpack a study tracking 1,422 procedural steps across 40 petrochemical operations. Using their Skip-Order-Action (SOA) Framework, they explored how frontline personnel navigate written instructions in practice: revealing that roughly 1/3 of steps depart from prescribed methods even when tasks are completed successfully. We explore how: a. the SOA framework functions b. how workers using p
E106: Boeing 737 MAX Disaster: When High-Authority Systems Go "Strong, Silent, and Wrong"
What happens when a high-authority automated system operate with an incorrect model of reality?This question is explored via Dekker & Woods’ (2024) article on automated systems that are Strong, Silent, and Wrong.We explore the breakdown of human-automation coordination, mode confusion, and automation surprises, using the Boeing 737 MAX MCAS accidents as a central example. Learn how complex sys
E105: Does Fatigue Cause Attentional Blindness? (Quickisode)
Can fatigue cause visual blindness in plant operators and drivers?In this video, I review a 2019 study from Li et al. (Automation in Construction) who used wearable eye-tracking tech to measure how prolonged excavator operation / time-on-task fatigue impacts hazard detection and visual attention.Namely, whether the operators notice workers walking behind the excavator over a shift.Key findings:a.
E104: Professor Robin Dillon-Merrill Part 1: Near Misses & Confusing Luck with Resilience
Do we routinely mistake good luck with systemic resilience – until something blows up?Today I speak with Professor Robin Dillon-Merrill (Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business), who breaks down her 20+ years of research on decision-making under risk, outcome bias, and how organizations misinterpret near misses.We discuss:• The differences between resilient vs vulnerable near misses: H
E103: Does HOP Actually Work? Real Data From a 5-Year Study (Quickisode)
Does a Human & Organizational Performance (HOP) initiative improve learning and the quality of actions? And what happens when the initiative stops?This quickisode unpacks Christopher Mastrangelo’s 2026 Master’s thesis examining a multi-year HOP implementation at a large biopharmaceutical company. His project tracked operational data from 2020 through July 2025 across key metrics: a. deviation
E102: Writing Better Safety Procedures Part 2: Rules vs Reality, WAI/WAD, Safety-II & Workarounds
In a 5-year petrochemical study examining over 1,400 work steps, 1/3 were performed differently from what was written in the procedure, but every task was completed successfully.Is this non-compliance or a display of worker aptitude and resilient skill?In Part 2 of our series on procedures, we look beyond the "100% compliance" rhetoric and unpack the gap between work-as-imagined (WAI) and work-as-
E101: From Blame to Restorative Justice: A Just Culture Tool (HOP / Safety-II / New View)
Do traditional approaches unintentionally blame front-line workers instead of fixing broken organisational systems?This Quickisode unpacks how an international energy company redesigned its Just Culture (JC) framework to shift focus from individual culpability to systemic weaknesses.This company found that traditional approaches relied on judgement terminology, like violation or negligence, and fr
E100: Dr Linda Bellamy Part 2: Fatal vs Minor hazards, SIFs & Barrier Failures
Part 2 discussion with Dr Linda Bellamy on SIFs, fatal accidents, and barrier failures.Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson
E99: 25 Questions for Better Incident Investigations | Safety-II / HOP
Do your investigations often conclude when you've identified 'human error', or a pesky person not following rules?Do you want to improve the quality and depth of your learning opportunities?One way is via local rationality: understanding why decisions & actions made sense to people at the time. It's a core feature in human factors / safety-II / and Human and Organizational Perf
E98: Writing better procedures part 1: Action verbs, human factors & more
Why are so many procedures technically accurate, but barely workable in practice?In Part 1 of this two part series on procedural systems, we unpack the technical side of writing better, more useable procedures: exploring how to reduce safety clutter, choosing the right type of rule, and structure instructions so they support work.We unpack:• Types of rules: performance goal vs. process vs. action
E97: Investigating when 'Nothing' Failed: a Safety-II/HOP debrief tool (Quickisode)
This quickisode races through a Safety-II / HOP inspired debrief tool which can help unearth 'hidden' insights about work that doesn't rely on incidents for learning.Resources & Links:Website & Articles: https://safetyinsights.orgSupport the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson
E96: Dr Linda Bellamy Part 1: Fatal vs Minor hazards, SIFs & Barrier Failures
Is there a relationship between fatal and minor hazard exposures? Recent SIF research & movements suggest 'NO' - what kills people aren't the same as what hurts them.But is that scientifically accurate? Part 1 discussion with Dr Linda Bellamy, who undertook perhaps the largest study of this kind exploring the connection - and, there ** is ** a connection.We discuss barrier/control
E95: Critical Controls & Barriers - Part 4: What do barrier models leave out? A Safety-II critique
A bowtie or critical control register may be useful tools, but they aren't the work.In Part 4 of this series, I unpack what control / barrier models can leave out: e.g. changing conditions, competing goals, control dependencies, unintended consequences and the adaptations people make to keep work functioning.I also explore how controls can change the systems they are introduced into, why more
E94: Dr Marcin Nazaruk Part 2: HOP, New View, Learning from Daily Work
Today I interview Dr Marcin Nazaruk, who shares his practical experience and research on learning from normal work / daily work, HOP / New View / Safety-II, to improve learning and risk management.The discussion also explores themes around risk controls, work constraints, risk assessments, and error traps.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson
E93: Critical Controls & Barriers & Safeguard | Part 3: Human Factors & Human Performance
How do we set realistic and effective human performance expectations in our barrier approaches?In part 1 we looked at definitions of controls and barriers, whereas in part 2 we explored a deeper dive into their applications and escalation factors.This episode unpacks a few key sources to explore critical human factors and human performance considerations for barrier / control systems.Website &
E92: Dr Marcin Nazaruk Part 1: HOP, New View, Learning from Daily Work
Today I interview Dr Marcin Nazaruk, who shares his practical experience and research on learning from normal work / daily work, HOP / New View / Safety-II, to improve learning and risk management.The discussion also explores themes around risk controls, work constraints, risk assessments, and error traps.Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinson
E91: Critical Controls & Barriers & Safeguards | Part 2: From paper to practice (e.g. bow-ties & more)
How do we translate a paper barrier system into one that's functional and verified as effective?Whereas part 1 looked at key definitions of control, barrier, safeguard, support, and verification activity - this episode dives deeper into the use of such frameworks.In particular, we unpack escalation / degradation / erosion factors, and the necessary support mechanisms to ensure controls work as
E90: Dr Guido Carim Jr Part 2
Part 2 of our interview with Dr. Guido Carim Junior, Associate Professor of Aviation, pilot, researcher, and safety scientist. We pick up the conversation with digital checklists, examining the potential role of AI and how "smart" features risk narrowing human decision-making rather than supporting it.Guido shares critical thoughts on the line between genuine organizational resilience an
E89: Critical Controls, Barriers & Safeguards | Part 1: Definitions & Inconsistencies
Is that a control, barrier, safeguard, support, or verification activity? Is it an object, a human act, a system or just a procedure? Does it actually address the hazardous energy, or does it sound good on paper?If we label every single checklist and administrative task a "critical control," do we risk diluting the operational focus required to prevent high-consequence events? If everyth
E88: Dr Guido Carim Jr Part 1
Interview with Guido part 1
E87: Risk Management vs. Rule Compliance: The False Choice
When you're standing on the front line making an operational call, risk doesn't come with a green or red light. You have to make a binary decision: stop or go.We don't necessarily make it easy for our decision-makers to make good, defendable decisions.This video unpacks Andrew Hopkins’ 2011 Safety Science article, "Risk Management & Rule Compliance: Decision-making in hazardou
E86: CEO speeches: Talking Our Way to Disaster #DeepWaterHorizon #BP
On April 15, 2010, BP CEO Tony Hayward reassured shareholders that the company was safer and more efficient than ever. Five days later, the Deepwater Horizon disaster happened. This video unpacks a study that evaluated CEO speeches and how rhetoric and slogans can be disconnected with actual behaviour and resourcing.It explores how relentless cost-cutting and corporate rhetoric set the stage for c
E85:When Success Leads to Disaster: Practical Drift & the 1994 Black Hawk Friendly Fire Shootdown
In 1994, two US Air force F15 fighters shot down two friendly US Army Black Hawk helicopters.This event shouldn't have been possible: there were experts, radio communications, radar, AWACS and more.However, this isn't a tragedy due to human error or a lack of safeguards, it happened in spite of the safeguards.This episode unpacks a few findings from the seminal book from Scott Snook called
E84: The pitfalls of safety reporting metrics and 'safewashing' our way to disaster
Can our safety reporting and indicators mask signals that organizations are drifting to major accident?This episode unpacks two reports from O'Neill and colleagues looking at the pitfalls of safety reporting measures, and also explores weaknesses in annual safety reports - particularly how reports may be 'safewashing'.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wav
E83: Why Smart Managers Ignore Deadly Warning Signs: Gretley & Moura Mine Disasters
This ep unpacks two articles from Andrew Hopkins, exploring the similarities between the Gretley and Moura mine disasters.Namely, Hopkins argues that a 'culture of denial' existed at both mines, and probably exists across large, high-risk organisations, too. This culture of denial involved a series of beliefs that dismissed warning signs of danger.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/O
E82: Why Good Leaders Make Terrible Decisions (The Science of Bias)
Our mental shortcuts (heuristics) serve us well. They help us navigate a complex, ambiguous world normally safely and efficiently.But in modern organisations, they can sometimes lead us astray - via biases. In this context biases are systematic distortions away from an expected decision or judgement.This article, with Daniel Kahneman and colleagues, unpack some ways to help debias critical decisio
E81: Is Safety Culture a Failed or Useful Concept for Organizations? A review of the Scientific Research
Is 'Safety Culture' a nebulous construct, or even a myth, that obscures more than it reveals? Or is its persistence because it provides a useful vehicle for explaining phenomena in organisations and groups?This episode unpacks several articles (at least 10), from authors like Borys, Guldenmund, Schein, Silbey, Hopkins, Cooper and more, to unpack safety culture from both an interpretative a
E80: Is Your Boss Just "Peacocking"? The Science of Leader Walkarounds
Leadership walkarounds seem simple on paper: get a leader to walk around, talk with some people, and then bounce out with a gleeful smile, and warm hearts.But is it that simple? Do walkarounds improve any measures of teams or organisations? Do they improve safety climate, engagement, or even safety incidents?Support the channel: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonToday's episode explores th
E79: AI Makes you Smarter but not Wiser: How AI affects your Cognition
Does using AI make us smarter, or just more confident?This ep covers a recent study on how generative AI affects our "metacognition" - our ability to judge our own performance. Researchers tracked hundreds of people solving logical reasoning problems with and without AI.They found: a) AI improved scores, but people overestimated their results even more, b) people who knew more about AI w
E78: The most effective safety tactics according to science
There are a lot of safety practices in industry. How do we know which are the most effective interventions to use?This systematic review of the evidence assesses the best evidence to answer this question.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you find it useful then please help share
E77: Behavior-based safety (BBS) - a balanced review of the science
When I say BBS - what is your initial impression? A big smile and thumbs up, or visible disgust?It certainly divides people. But is that division deserved? What does the evidence say are both the pros and cons of BBS approaches?And, how can we move forward with this debate and incorporate the best of both? Or, should we?This episode references 7 articles to provide an overview and balanced discuss
E76: Dreamworld disaster and the pathways to failure
This episode unpacks the Dreamworld Thunder Rapid ride disaster, using the Ten Pathways to Failure model.Ref: Gregson, S., & Quinlan, M. G. (2024). Death at Dreamworld: Ten pathways to disaster and failure to learn. The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 35(2), 436-453.Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonMore research at SafetyInsights.OrgOutro music "Dark Syn
E75: Better indicators for your risk control system
How can you develop better indicators targeting the effectiveness of your risk control system?This episode draws on a few sources, including the HSE UK's HSG254 and the ICMM's critical control framework, among others, outlining an approach to safety indicators that targets measuring the most important elements of your risk control systems.Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/be
E74: Zombie leadership - old ideas that refuse to die
Re-recording of an older episode for YouTube
E73: When business indicators become the problem
Does counting change what counts? If we create indicators on actions that we'd like to monitor, like injuries, profits, tendering, productivity, do we inadvertently focus on managing the numbers instead of the core issues?Source: Chang, L. W., Kirgios, E. L., Mullainathan, S., & Milkman, K. L. (2024). Does counting change what counts? Quantification fixation biases decision-making. Proceed
E72: Fatal Blind Spot: Why Leader Safety Walkarounds Failed Deepwater Horizon
Seven hours before the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, four senior executives were on-site congratulating the crew for achieving seven years without a lost-time injury. It wasn’t that these leaders ignored risk; it’s that they were systematically blinded to it by a focus on the 'wrong' metrics. In this episode, we break down Andrew Hopkins’ analysis of that final visit to explore the important dis
E71: Leaders, schmeaders...the age of FOLLOWERSHIP is here
Leadership captures the headlines and conference topics worldwide, but what is the role of followers in team and organisational performance?How can one lead, without those that follow?Refs:1. Leung, C., Lucas, A., Brindley, P., Anderson, S., Park, J., Vergis, A., & Gillman, L. M. (2018). Followership: a review of the literature in healthcare and beyond. Journal of critical care, 46, 99-104.2.
E70: Learning Teams: Why Blaming Staff Doesn't Make Workplaces Safer
How well do Learning Teams compare to RCAs for the number and quality of findings? This study compares the two.Note: Update and reupload of a previous episode, now in video format.Ref: Robbins, T., Tipper, S., King, J., Ramachandran, S. K., Pandit, J. J., & Pandit, M. (2021). Evaluation of learning teams versus root cause analysis for incident investigation in a large United Kingdom National H
E69: Precursors of SIFS & ineffective corrective actions
What are the precursor factors that kill people at work? And are our investigations effectively fixing these factors?Ref: Stockel, L. R. (2023). What Causes Accidents at Work? Workplace Serious Incident & Fatality Investigations: A Study of Precursors.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on S
E68: Do warning signs work? A dive into the science
You saw the sign, and read the words. So, apparently you understand the risk, or do you?Source: Hancock, P. A., Kaplan, A. D., MacArthur, K. R., & Szalma, J. L. (2020). How effective are warnings? A meta-analysis. Safety Science, 130, 104876.Support the channel at: https://buymeacoffee.com/benhutchinsonMore research at SafetyInsights.OrgOutro music "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen
E67: Designing safer and healthier shift work systems/rosters
How can we design better - as in safer, healthier, more productive shift work systems and rosters? Let's find out.Sources:QGN 16. Guidance Note for Fatigue Risk Management. Department of Natural Resources, Mines and EnergyKnauth, P. (1996). Designing better shift systems. Applied ergonomics, 27(1), 39-44.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.co
E66: Is AI BS'ing you?
Are AI models BS'ing you? Do they have such an indifference--a lack of understanding even--about the truth, that their outputs constitute BS?Note: This is an update and recording of #33, where I rerecord interesting topics for my YouTube channel.Source: Hicks, M. T., Humphries, J., & Slater, J. (2024). ChatGPT is bullshit. Ethics and Information Technology, 26(2), 1-10.Support the channel
E65: The use and abuse of safety indicators
Safety indicators, metrics, measures, KPIs...whatever. Are these indicators used primarily for genuine learning and improvement - or more often misinterpreted and misused?Ref: Oswald, D., Zhang, R. P., Lingard, H., Pirzadeh, P., & Le, T. (2018). The use and abuse of safety indicators in construction. Engineering, construction and architectural management, 25(9), 1188-1209.Support the channel a
E64: How can we move forward from notions of 'human error'?
This paper explores how complex systems not only fail, but succeed, and provides 9 ways that we can move beyond simplistic notions of system failure due to 'human error'.Ref: Woods, D. D., & Cook, R. I. (2002). Nine steps to move forward from error. Cognition, technology & work, 4(2), 137-144.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGre
E63: Should we, or even can we, analyse 'safety culture' in investigations?
'Safety Culture' is treated by some as the holy grail of organisational safety concepts: valourised and promoted uncritically.But should we, or even can we, analyse 'safety culture' in investigations?More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you find it useful
E62: Types of error - error as cause, event, or harm
What do we mean when we say 'human error'? Do you mean as a cause, event, or harm? And does error language more broadly mask more underpinning human variability, and increase the risk of blame?Sources:1. Hollnagel, E. (2007). Human error: Trick or treat. Handbook of applied cognition, 219-238.2. Read, G. J., Shorrock, S., Walker, G. H., & Salmon, P. M. (2021). State of science: evolvin
E61: Another deep dive on human performance in barrier systems
How should we plan, design and integrate human performance into our risk control and barrier systems?This episode draws on four sources:Mantom, M., Johnson, M., Pitblado, R., Cowley, C., & Krishna, K. (2017). Standardisation of Bow Tie Methodology and Terminology via a CCPS/EI Book. In Chem. E., SYMPOSIUM SERIES (No. 162).Human Factors in Barrier Management: white paper (2016). Chartered Insti
E60: Psychology of risk and motivating less risky decisions
How can we motivate--or even design for--more desirable, safer decisions on health, safety and life, and disincentivise riskier decisions?This episodes explores Gerald Wilde's four tactics of motivating safer behaviour, from his book 'Target Risk 3'.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe A
E59: Predictors of the use of higher-order risk controls
What factors predict the use of higher-order risk controls? This study unpacks the predictors via use of HECA (High-Energy Control Assessment).Source: Oguz Erkal, E. D., Hallowell, M. R., Ghriss, A., & Bhandari, S. (2024). Predicting serious injury and fatality exposure using machine learning in construction projects. Journal of construction engineering and management, 150(3), 04023169.More re
E58: Diving into a process of Safety Decluttering
Today we're diving into the CSRA's Safety Clutter Classification model and process of decluttering.Source is: Decluttering Safety report, from the Construction Safety Research Alliance, 2025.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you find it useful then please help
E57: Safety clutter - paper tigers and non-value adding work
How does safety clutter--the accumulation of safety artefacts that don't contribute to operational safety--distract attention and resources from more pressing matters? Can clutter, with best intentions, even contribute to elevated risk?Today's paper is: Rae, A. J., Provan, D. J., Weber, D. E., & Dekker, S. W. (2018). Safety clutter: the accumulation and persistence of ‘safety’ work tha
E56: Walk-Through Talk-Through - a technique for learning about daily work and error traps
This quickisode jumps into the Walk-Through Talk-Through technique, used to collaborate with workers and learn about the challenges and error traps with tasks, and how to improve.Source: Human Performance Oil & Gas. HPOG.orgMore research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you fin
E55: Butt-covering paperwork & false safety
What if the paperwork that management come to rely on, rather than providing assurance of safe work methods, is more a ritual, disconnected from real work, or how people create safety in the field?What if, in some cases, this paperwork creates a false sense of safety and indeed, masquerades as a false butt covering exercise?Today's source is: Borys, D. (2009). Exploring risk-awareness as a cul
E54: Work-as-imagined, prescribed, disclosed and done
How do the models of how we think about work reveal and conceal features of the work? Today we explore varieties of human work: work-as-imagined, work-as-prescribed, work-as-disclosed, and work-as-done.Source: Shorrock, S. (2016, December 5). The varieties of human work. Humanistic Systems. https://humanisticsystems.com/2016/12/05/the-varieties-of-human-work/More research at SafetyInsights.OrgInt
E53: Weak Controls. Repeat Deaths. The Brady review into mining fatalities
Imagine following a workplace fatality, that the weakest types of controls are implemented - administrative. This episode unpacks some findings from the Brady review of Qld mining fatalities and what lessons we can apply from weak controls and repeat deaths.Source: Brady, S. (2019). Review of all fatal accidents in Queensland mines and quarries from 2000 to 2019. Department of Natural Resources, M
E52: Tapping into the semiotics of risk - workspace, headspace, groupspace
How can we move beyond simple workplace hazards towards tackling risk from psychological and cultural cues in the workplace? Today we unpack Rob Long's Workspace / Headspace / Groupspace risk semiotic to help mature our thinking.Sources: 1. Safety Engagement with Workspace, Headspace and Groupspace. Rob Long, 2021, SafetyRisk . net2. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK TOOLS (2015). Human Dymensions3. W
E51: The links between hazardous energy magnitude and injury severity
What are the links between the magnitude of the energy within hazard exposures on subsequent injury severity and death?Does more energy = higher chance of SIFs?Source: Hallowell, M. R., Alexander, D., & Gambatese, J. A. (2017). Energy-based safety risk assessment: Does magnitude and intensity of energy predict injury severity?. Construction management and economics, 35(1-2), 64-77.More researc
E50: Ed Schein's Humble Inquiry - “The Gentle Art of Asking Instead of Telling” (quickisode)
This quickisode unpacks Ed Schein's concept of Humble Inquiry - said to be the "gentle art of asking instead of telling".Source: Schein, E. H. (2013). Humble inquiry: The gentle art of asking instead of telling. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spot
E49: CEO-speak and the road to major disasters
What does the leadership language used by CEOs tell us about the priority and beliefs around safety and risk? This episode unpacks a study exploring the BP CEO's speeches prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster.Source: Amernic, J., & Craig, R. (2017). CEO speeches and safety culture: British Petroleum before the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Critical perspectives on accounting, 47, 61-80.
E48: Blame fixes ... something ???
Does blame really solve nothing...or does it have some redeeming features?Source: van Mourik, O., Grohnert, T., & Gold, A. (2023). Mitigating work conditions that can inhibit learning from errors: Benefits of error management climate perceptions. Frontiers in Psychology, 14, 1033470.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make s
E47: Improving procedures via resilient skills - leveraging resilience engineering (quickisode)
This quickisode explores how resilience engineering - particularly enhancing resilient skills - can improve procedures.Source: Saurin, T. A., Wachs, P., & Costella, M. F. (2015). Exploring synergies between the design of procedures and the development of resilience skills. In Proceedings of the 6th Resilience Engineering Symposium.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synt
E46: The Stuff That Kills People and weaknesses in Critical Control Programs
How do Critical Control programs succeed or fault and trip? And are CC observations calibrated to the actual things that kill or permanently injure people? This episode unpacks creative sentencing reports.Article: Lefsrud, L. M., Sattari, F., Gellatly, I. R., Wasel, C., Charuvil Elizabeth, R. M., Abdolmaleki, A., ... & O’Neill, T. (2025). Final Report for Creative Sentence: Building Resilience
E45: Unpacking Officer Due Diligence based on a Maritime NZ prosecution
This episode unpacks findings from the recent Maritime NZ / Port of Auckland case, where a CEO was charged under due diligence offences.It offers an enlightening perspective on work-as-done, night shift work, critical controls and more.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if
E44: Human-centred design - some terms from Don Norman (quickisode)
This quickisode dives into some key human-centred design terms from the GOAT, Don Norman.The source is: Norman, D. (2013). The design of everyday things.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you find it useful then please help share the news, and leave a rating and review
E43: How 'no blame' can potentially subvert learning and improvement
Few would disagree that blame negatively impacts learning.However, can efforts to promote 'no blame' approaches also carry their own negative and unintended impacts on learning and improvement?Today's article is: Sherratt, F., Thallapureddy, S., Bhandari, S., Hansen, H., Harch, D., & Hallowell, M. R. (2023). The unintended consequences of no blame ideology for incident investigatio
E42: The blindspots of incident reporting approaches
Are our incident reporting systems providing accurate reflections of incidents and severity, or blinkered, highly selective views disconnected from actual injury severities?Today's article: Geddert, K., Dekker, S., & Rae, A. (2021). How does selective reporting distort understanding of workplace injuries?. Safety, 7(3), 58.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wa
E41: Writing better procedures with the dark arts of human factors (quickisode)
How can we apply the dark arts of Human Factors to write better procedures? Let's find out.Today's source is: HPOG (2021). Best Practice in Procedure Formatting.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spotify/Apple, and if you find it useful then please help share the news, and leave a ra
E40: Types and mechanisms of investigator bias
What are the types and mechanisms of investigator bias, and what are some proposed debiasing methods and improvements?Today's article: MacLean, C. L. (2022). Cognitive bias in workplace investigation: Problems, perspectives and proposed solutions. Applied Ergonomics, 105, 103860.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure
E39: How biased are incident investigators?
Investigations are reputed to be 'fact finding' exercises: objective searches for facts and truth.How what role does investigator bias play in constructing the incident findings?Today's article is: MacLean, C. L., & Dror, I. E. (2023). Measuring base-rate bias error in workplace safety investigators. Journal of safety research, 84, 108-116.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark
E38: 4Ds - Dumb, Dangerous, Different, Difficult - for learning (quickisode)
This quickisode unpacks the 4D method for learning: Dumb, Dangerous, Different, Difficult.The source is Sutton et al. 2023. 4Ds for HOP and Learning Teams: A practical how-to guide to facilitate learning from everyday work, critical and dynamic risks with the 4Ds.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on Spo
E37: Psychological Safety - what is it good for? A meta-analysis of research
Psychological safety has reached almost Deity levels.Every third business, HR or tech article and its dog seems to mention Psychological Safety.But what does evidence underpins the construct? As we'll find, even by 2017, quite a lot.Today's article is Frazier, M. L., Fainshmidt, S., Klinger, R. L., Pezeshkan, A., & Vracheva, V. (2017). Psychological safety: A meta‐analytic review and extension
E36: How audits fail prior to major accidents
How do audits fail to avert major disasters? What do investigations after a major accident say about the performance, or failures, of audits?Today's article is Hutchinson, B., Dekker, S., & Rae, A. (2024). How audits fail according to accident investigations: A counterfactual logic analysis. Process Safety Progress, 43(3), 441-454.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wav
E35: Critical Steps for managing hazardous work (quickisode)
Some task steps are so important, that marshal or exchange so much energy, that they must go right first time, every time. These are called Critical Steps. Let's explore critical steps and risk important decisions.Today's source is: Muschara, T., Farris, R., & Marinus, J. (2021). Critical steps: managing what must go right in high-risk operations. CRC Press.More research at SafetyInsig
E34: The failure of critical controls in construction
How reliable are the critical controls within construction? Which critical controls fail, and how?Today's article is Selleck, R., Hassall, M., & Cattani, M. (2022). Determining the reliability of critical controls in construction projects. Safety, 8(3), 64.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Saf
EP33: Is ChatGPT bullsh** you? How Large Language models aim to be convincing rather than truthful
Large Language Models, like ChatGPT, have amazing capabilities. But are their responses, aiming to be convincing human text, more indicative of BS? That is, responses that are indifferent to the truth?If they are, what are the practical implications?Today's paper is: Hicks, M. T., Humphries, J., & Slater, J. (2024). ChatGPT is bullshit. Ethics and Information Technology, 26(2), 1-10.More r
EP32: Navigating fatigue risk with the defences in depth approach
This episode discusses Dawson & McCulloch's structured defences in depth approach to navigate occupational fatigue at different levels.Today's paper: Dawson, D., & McCulloch, K. (2005). Managing fatigue: it's about sleep. Sleep medicine reviews, 9(5), 365-380.More research at SafetyInsights.OrgIntro/Output "Dark Synth Wave" by ElephantGreen (PixaBay.com)Make sure to subscribe to Safe As on
Recommended
The Rush Hour with Dobbo & Elliott
Triple M Rocks Footy AFL
7AFL Podcasts
Australia All Over
Christianityworks with Berni Dymet
Triple M Breakfast with Kaz & Tubes - Triple M Hobart 107.3
The Unplayable Podcast
Rise and Shine
Country Breakfast
KIIS Breakfast
SBS Mandarin - SBS 普通话电台
V180 Daily Devotion
